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AMBRO, Circuit Judge  
Alexander Golubitsky, Esq., appeals the District 
Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw as appointed criminal 
counsel due to a conflict of interest.  Though it is not a final 
order, we nonetheless have appellate jurisdiction to hear this 
interlocutory appeal and review the order denying the motion 
to withdraw under the collateral order doctrine first announced 
in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 
(1949).  On the merits, we vacate the District Court’s order 
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denying the motion to withdraw and remand for further fact-
finding.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Golubitsky is a former panelist on the Criminal Justice 
Act (“CJA”) panel in the District Court of the Virgin Islands.  
He is currently admitted to practice before that Court.  Per its 
CJA plan, on March 25, 2019, Golubitsky was appointed 
counsel for Wayne Bellille, an indigent defendant in a large 
multi-defendant RICO prosecution.   
Golubitsky moved to withdraw shortly after.  He argued 
that he was no longer a member of the CJA panel and that he 
had moved to an in-house counsel role, was contractually 
barred from taking on the representation, and lacked the ability 
and resources to represent Bellille.  Golubitsky thereafter 
entered an appearance for Bellille and attended a hearing on 
the motion to withdraw.  The District Court denied his motion. 
On September 11, 2019, Golubitsky and Joseph 
DiRuzzo III purport to have started an of-counsel relationship 
at the law firm of DiRuzzo & Company.  On September 20, 
Golubitsky filed an ex parte emergency motion to withdraw as 
Bellille’s counsel.  He stated that he had recently associated on 
an “of counsel” basis with the DiRuzzo law firm and had 
learned during a conflicts check that the firm’s principal, 
DiRuzzo, represented a cooperating witness, Aracelis Ayala, 
who was likely to testify against Bellille in his trial.  Golubitsky 
argued that, because he would have to cross-examine Ayala at 
trial, this created a conflict of interest under local court rules 
and the Virgin Islands Rules of Professional Conduct.   
The District Court held a hearing to consider the motion 
on October 30 and 31, 2019.  DiRuzzo attended the second day.  
During the hearing, the Court inquired as to the nature of the 
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association between Golubitsky and DiRuzzo’s firm.  
Golubitsky explained that he was “on [the firm’s] system,” 
could bill using the firm’s software, and was added to 
DiRuzzo’s malpractice insurance.  J.A. 108.  DiRuzzo 
confirmed the same.  Golubitsky, however, continued to work 
full-time as in-house counsel at a Virgin Islands-based 
company, Brisa Max Holdings VI, LLC (“Brisa Max”), while 
working part-time for DiRuzzo’s firm, which is located in 
Florida.  Aside from the Bellille prosecution, DiRuzzo and 
Golubitsky were litigating four matters together.  The Court 
inquired whether they had any involvement in the other’s work 
related to Bellille’s case or whether they had shared with each 
other any information about the case obtained in the course of 
their respective representations.  Both responded they had not.  
DiRuzzo testified that he was not sure he could implement 
“screening” measures in the Bellille matter but would look into 
it, and Golubitsky maintained that “I don’t think that I can be 
walled off from this conflict,” J.A. 109, as the DiRuzzo firm 
consisted of just two attorneys aside from Golubitsky.  
Golubitsky would be forced, he believed, to violate his ethical 
obligations, and his client’s Sixth Amendment right to conflict-
free counsel would be violated as well.   
At the end of the hearing, the District Court orally 
denied Golubitsky’s motion to withdraw and ordered DiRuzzo 
and Golubitsky to wall off the latter’s representation of Bellille 
from DiRuzzo’s representation of Ayala.  The Court 
emphasized that the relationship between DiRuzzo and 
Golubitsky was “part-time” and “ad hoc,” and thus a wall could 
effectively be put in place to separate the representations.  J.A. 
141.  Golubitsky appealed to us. 
On March 24, 2020, well after this appeal was filed, the 
District Court issued a written opinion denying Bellille’s 
motion to withdraw.  It reasoned that attorney conflicts are not 
imputed to a law firm if the relationship between the attorney 
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and the firm is not a sufficiently close one.  See United States 
v. Bellille, Cr. No. 2018-30, 2020 WL 1441648, at *6–7 (D.V.I. 
Mar. 24, 2020) (citing United States v. Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d 
365, 375–76 (6th Cir. 2015); Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Inc. Vill. 
of Valley Stream, 409 F.3d 127, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2005)).  The 
Court did not mention the conflict wall it had ordered the 
attorneys to put in place and did not explain why it would be 
necessary if there is no conflict of interest or how it should be 
implemented if a conflict does exist.  It noted, however, that 
the Federal Public Defender and most CJA panelists in the 
Virgin Islands are conflicted in the underlying criminal case 
and that “the existing CJA panel is inadequate to provide 
representation as required to the defendants in this matter.”  Id. 
at *5.    
II. JURISDICTION 
The District Court of the Virgin Islands had subject 
matter jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a) and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  But was its order denying Golubitsky’s second motion 
to withdraw appealable to us?  The Government says no, as the 
final judgment rule requires that “a party must ordinarily raise 
all claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment 
on the merits.”  Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 
U.S. 368, 374 (1981).  Golubitsky responds that we have 
jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine.  
That doctrine—first announced in Cohen, 337 U.S. 
541—provides that there is a “small class” of rulings that, 
although they do not terminate the litigation, are appropriately 
deemed “final” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Firestone, 449 U.S. 
at 374; Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.  That small class is comprised 
of decisions that (1) conclusively determine the disputed 
issues, (2) resolve important issues separate from the merits, 
and (3) are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final 
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judgment in the underlying action.  See, e.g., Bacher v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 2000).   
 The Government cites Supreme Court precedent that the 
collateral order doctrine does not apply to orders granting 
motions for disqualification of defense counsel.  See Flanagan 
v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984).  No doubt Flanagan 
concluded that “[n]othing about a disqualification order 
distinguishes it from the run of pretrial judicial decisions that 
affect the rights of criminal defendants yet must await 
completion of trial-court proceedings for review.”  Id. at 270.  
And the Government correctly points out that other circuits to 
address the issue have also held orders granting or denying 
motions to disqualify are not subject to the collateral order 
doctrine.  See, e.g., United States v. Sueiro, 946 F.3d 637, 642–
43 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Camisa, 969 F.2d 1428, 
1429 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Caggiano, 660 F.2d 184, 
191 & n.7 (6th Cir. 1981).  
However, courts have distinguished motions to 
disqualify from motions to withdraw.  Neither the Supreme 
Court, nor any court of appeals to consider the issue, has held 
that the denial of a motion to withdraw fails interlocutory 
review under the collateral order doctrine in civil cases.  See, 
e.g., Sanford v. Maid-Rite Corp., 816 F.3d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 
2016) (per curiam) (holding that denying a motion to withdraw 
satisfied each of the three requirements of the doctrine because, 
“[f]irst, it conclusively determined whether the firm must 
continue to represent its client. . . .  Second, the withdrawal 
issue was ‘completely separate from the merits . . . .’  Finally, 
the order would have been unreviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment because ‘having to go through trial is itself a loss of 
the right involved.’” (citations omitted)); Brandon v. Blech, 
560 F.3d 536, 537 (6th Cir. 2009) (“An order compelling an 
attorney to continue work without compensation is just the sort 
of order the doctrine contemplates: it conclusively determined 
7 
 
the withdrawal question, is unrelated to the merits, cannot be 
rectified after a final judgment, and may impose significant 
hardship.”); Rivera-Domenech v. Calvesbert Law Offices PSC, 
402 F.3d 246, 249 (1st Cir. 2005); Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co. of 
N.Y. v. Intercty. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 537, 539–40 (7th 
Cir. 2002); Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.3d 317, 319–20 (2d Cir. 
1999) (per curiam).  This distinction exists because, “[u]nlike 
an order granting or denying a motion to disqualify an attorney, 
which primarily affects the interests of the underlying litigants 
. . . , an order denying counsel’s motion to withdraw primarily 
affects the counsel forced to continue representing a client 
against his or her wishes.”  Whiting, 187 F.3d at 320 (per 
curiam) (citation omitted).  “[O]nce a final judgment has been 
entered, the harm to [the attorney] will be complete, and no 
relief can be obtained on appeal.”  Id.  
We have not squarely addressed whether the collateral 
order doctrine applies to orders denying motions to withdraw 
due to a conflict of interest.  In Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, 
Inc., 802 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1986), we held that an order 
denying a law firm’s motion to withdraw after entry of 
judgment, but before the conclusion of post-judgment 
discovery, was immediately appealable although there were 
still proceedings ongoing in the district court.  We relied on the 
doctrine of “practical finality” and did not address the 
collateral order doctrine, but the reasoning was much the same 
as above: the attorney would “be effectively denied meaningful 
review of the order” if not permitted to appeal immediately.  Id. 
at 678.  
Years later, United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002 (3d 
Cir. 1993), held that the collateral order doctrine did not apply 
to an order appointing a firm as standby counsel for its former 
client.  The district court required the firm to serve without 
compensation, that a firm attorney be present at all pretrial 
proceedings, and that two named partners be present 
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throughout the months-long trial.  Id. at 1007–10.  We reasoned 
that although the order met the first two collateral-order 
prongs—it conclusively determined the disputed question and 
resolved an important issue completely separate from the 
merits—it failed the third, which requires the order to be 
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.  Id. 
at 1014.  But because the order raised “fundamental, unsettled 
issues concerning a district court’s inherent power over the 
attorneys who practice before it,” id. at 1005, we treated the 
appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus and exercised 
jurisdiction, see id. at 1014–15.  We ultimately held that the 
district court had abused its discretion in ordering the firm to 
serve under the circumstances.  Id. at 1006.1 
The Government asserts Bertoli held that orders 
denying motions to withdraw are categorically exempt from 
the collateral order doctrine.2  We disagree.  In Bertoli we did 
 
1 Golubitsky mentions two unreported decisions of our 
Court holding that the collateral order doctrine applies to 
orders denying motions to withdraw.  Erie Molded Plastics, 
Inc. v. Nogah, LLC, 520 F. App’x 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2013); United 
States ex rel. Magid v. Barry Wilderman M.D., P.C., 305 F. 
App’x 41, 42 (3d Cir. 2008).  We, however, do not rely on 
either, as by tradition we do not cite as authority our not 
precedential opinions.  3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7.  
 
2 The Government alternatively relies on our statement 
in Bertoli that we prefer “to postpone review of an order 
directed against a non-party until the case is concluded in the 
district court or until the non-party has been held in contempt,” 
994 F.2d at 1013, to argue that non-parties such as Golubitsky 
must suffer contempt before they can appeal.  However, we 
also made clear that contempt may be unnecessary “if there is 
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not consider a motion to withdraw as counsel based on a 
conflict of interest, but rather to withdraw as stand-by counsel 
based on the onerous conditions imposed by the district court.  
Whether Golubitsky will be forced to violate his ethical 
obligations and whether he will be denied meaningful review 
after trial are before us here.  And as noted, we ultimately 
decided Bertoli on principles applicable to the rarely invoked 
writ of mandamus, not something we even consider here.  
Given the interests Golubitsky claims are violated, our analysis 
of the third prong of the collateral order doctrine is different 
than in Bertoli.  It thus does not foreclose the possibility that 
the collateral order doctrine applies to orders denying motions 
to withdraw.3 
 
no real possibility of [an appeal] disrupting an underlying 
action,” see id. (quoting United States v. Sciarra, 851 F.2d 621, 
629 (3d Cir. 1988)), and the Government has made no 
allegation of disruption flowing from Golubitsky’s appeal.  In 
fact, at oral argument it noted that if Golubitsky were removed 
as counsel, the District Court would likely appoint replacement 
counsel “in short order.”  Tr. 24.  Moreover, we have never 
read Bertoli for the broad proposition that non-parties must 
suffer contempt before securing appellate review.  
 
3 Golubitsky argues in the alternative that the All Writs 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, gives us jurisdiction because we 
disposed of Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, by treating the petition as 
one seeking a writ of mandamus, id. at 1014.  We need not 
decide this contention because here the collateral order 
doctrine applies.  Moreover, mandamus is not warranted if the 
relief sought can be obtained through another means.  See 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) 
(explaining that to obtain mandamus relief a petitioner must 
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If there is tension between the conclusion in Ohntrup 
that the attorney would “be effectively denied meaningful 
review of the order” denying his motion to withdraw if not 
permitted to appeal until after the conclusion of post-judgment 
discovery, 802 F.2d at 678, and the conclusion in Bertoli that 
the attorneys did not show that the order would be effectively 
unreviewable after trial, 994 F.2d at 1014, we hold that a 
motion to withdraw were there a conflict of interest would be 
effectively unreviewable because the harm of violating one’s 
ethical obligations would be complete and could not be undone 
after trial.  We need not rely on either the doctrine of practical 
finality or the dramatic remedy of mandamus because all three 
prongs of the collateral order doctrine are satisfied. 
Although the weight of the authority holding that orders 
denying motions to withdraw are collaterally appealable is 
civil in nature, the reasons for applying the collateral order 
doctrine are equally compelling in the criminal context.  The 
Second Circuit has so held.  See United States v. Barton, 712 
F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Whiting, 187 F.3d at 320 
(per curiam)); United States v. Oberoi, 331 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 
2003).  It analogized the denial of a motion to withdraw to the 
“denial of immunity or of a double jeopardy claim, which are 
reviewable under the collateral order doctrine on the ground 
that having to go through a trial is itself a loss of the right 
involved.”  Whiting, 187 F.3d at 320 (per curiam).  The ethical 
violations counsel would be forced to commit for conflicts of 
interest are the same in the civil and criminal context.  Once a 
 
show, inter alia, that “no other adequate means [exist] to attain 
the relief he desires” (alteration in original) (quoting Cheney v. 
U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004))).  In our 
case, appellate jurisdiction to decide is not only adequate, but 
it is more so than the last resort of mandamus.   
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court compels an attorney to violate ethical obligations, the 
harm is done, whether the matter be a civil or a criminal trial.  
In sum, Golubitsky’s interlocutory appeal satisfies all 
three requirements of the collateral order doctrine.  First, the 
District Court’s denial of his motion conclusively determined 
its outcome.  The Court denied his motion to withdraw and 
ordered Golubitsky and DiRuzzo to erect a wall separating 
their representations of Bellille and Ayala.  Second, whether 
Golubitsky has a conflict of interest is separate from the merits 
of the underlying criminal matter involving a vast RICO 
conspiracy.  Likewise, any order directing him and DiRuzzo 
on how to arrange their purported law practice is separate from 
the trial’s merits.  And the order will effectively be 
unreviewable after trial, as Golubitsky will already have 
suffered the harm of being forced to violate his ethical 
obligations.  See Sanford, 816 F.3d at 549 (per curiam) 
(holding that order denying motion to withdraw was 
effectively unreviewable after case conclusion); Whiting, 187 
F.3d at 319–20 (per curiam) (same). 
Accordingly, we have appellate jurisdiction to review 
the District Court’s order.   
III. MERITS 
We review the District Court’s denial of a motion to 
withdraw from representation for an abuse of discretion.  
Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 679; see also Whiting, 187 F.3d at 320.  
Questions regarding attorney appointment and withdrawal are 
committed to the District Court’s sound discretion, and its 
determination is guided by the professional rules of conduct.  
See Brandon, 560 F.3d at 537.  Golubitsky moved to withdraw 
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due to a conflict of interest, and thus we begin our analysis with 
the professional rules.4  
A. The Model Rules –– Identifying a Conflict of 
Interest 
The Virgin Islands Supreme Court adopts the American 
Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(“Model Rules”) and the commentary thereto as the Territory’s 
official set of ethics rules.  See In re Joseph, 56 V.I. 490, 496 
n.1 (2012) (per curiam) (citing V.I. Sup. Ct. R. 203(a)).  The 
District Court of the Virgin Islands follows suit.  D.V.I. Loc. 
R. Civ. P. 83.2(a)(1).  When faced with motions to disqualify 
or withdraw, “courts look to the provisions of the [Model 
Rules] for guidance.”  Crudele v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, Nos. 97-
 
4 Golubitsky also argues that although the CJA applies 
to the District Court of the Virgin Islands, see 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3006A(j), and it had the authority to implement a CJA plan 
and conscript attorneys who are not members of the CJA panel 
to represent indigent defendants, it is not an Article III court 
but rather a court of limited jurisdiction, see 48 U.S.C. § 1612, 
and thus did not have the authority to order the parties to 
implement screening mechanisms.  He does not cite any 
authority to support this proposition, and we are not aware of 
any.  Given district courts’ discretion in managing attorney 
appointment and withdrawal, and given the Model Rules’ 
instructions about screening mechanisms, we do not at this 
time determine whether and to what extent district courts can 
require parties to adopt them.  
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CV-6687 et al., 2001 WL 1033539, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 
2001).  
1. Model Rule 1.7: Conflicts of Interest and 
Current Clients   
Model Rule 1.7 applies where attorneys at the same firm 
have ethical obligations to different clients whose interests 
may conflict.  The Rule provides that a concurrent conflict of 
interest exists, so as to preclude representation as a general 
rule, if “(1) the representation of one client will be directly 
adverse to another client” or “(2) there is a significant risk that 
the representation of one or more clients will be materially 
limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a 
former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the 
lawyer.”  Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.7(a); V.I. Sup. Ct. 
R. 211.1.7(a).5  
However, the existence of a concurrent conflict of 
interest will not preclude representation if four requirements 
are met: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer 
will be able to provide competent and diligent 
representation to each affected client; 
 
5 One example of a concurrent conflict of interest is 
outlined in the Comments to Model Rule 1.7: when, as a result 
of undertaking a representation, the lawyer may be required to 
cross-examine his own client in another matter.  Model Rules 
of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.7 cmt. 6 (stating “a directly adverse 
conflict may arise when a lawyer is required to cross-examine 
a client who appears as a witness in a lawsuit involving another 
client”); In re Maynard, 60 V.I. 444, 449–50 (2014) (same).  
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(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion 
of a claim by one client against another client 
represented by the lawyer in the same litigation 
or other proceeding before a tribunal; and 
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, 
confirmed in writing. 
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.7(b); V.I. Sup. Ct. R. 
211.1.7(b). 
If any of those requirements is not met—if, for example, 
the representation is prohibited by law, or the client has not 
given consent in writing—then the conflicted counsel must 
withdraw or be disqualified.  And, to add another layer, the 
Comments to Model Rule 1.7 explain that the three categories 
outlined in Rule 1.7(b)(1)–(3) are “[p]rohibited 
[r]epresentations”: 
Ordinarily, clients may consent to representation 
notwithstanding a conflict. However, as 
indicated in paragraph (b), some conflicts are 
nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer 
involved cannot properly ask for such agreement 
or provide representation on the basis of the 
client’s consent.  
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.7 cmt. 14.  So, for example, 
“Paragraph (b)(3) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable 
. . . when the clients are aligned directly against each other in 
the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal.”  
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.7 cmt. 17.  Whether the 
clients are aligned against each other, and whether the 
representation involves the same litigation, “require[] 
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examination of the context of the proceeding.”  Id.  But, once 
the Court determines that the parties are on opposing sides, 
“[t]here is no exception to Rule 1.7(a) where the lawyer’s 
representation ‘involve[s] the assertion of a claim by one client 
against another client . . . in the same litigation.’”  Nunez v. 
Lovell, 50 V.I. 707, 715 (D.V.I. 2008) (Gomez, J.) (second and 
third alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.7(b)(3)); see also Cinema 
5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(disqualifying an attorney who was a partner at two firms that 
represented clients on opposing sides of the same litigation).  
2. Model Rule 1.10: Imputation of Conflicts 
of Interest  
Model Rule 1.10 requires imputing a conflict of interest 
from one attorney to other attorneys “[w]hile [they] are 
associated in a firm.”  Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 
1.10(a); V.I. Sup. Ct. R. 211.1.10.  If they are, then the conflict 
of one becomes the conflict of the other, and we must assess 
whether that presents a prohibited conflict under Model Rule 
1.7.   
Comment 1 to Model Rule 1.10 states that “the term 
‘firm’ denotes lawyers in a law partnership, professional 
corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized 
to practice law,” and clarifies that “[w]hether two or more 
lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend 
upon the specific facts.”  Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.10 
cmt. 1.  Courts have taken differing views regarding how of-
counsel relationships should be treated for purposes of 
imputing conflicts of interest.  Some have adopted a per se rule 
of imputation in those cases while others have taken a case-by-
case approach of “examin[ing] the substance of the 
relationship under review and the procedures in place.”  
Hempstead Video, Inc., 409 F.3d at 135–36 (collecting cases). 
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Screening mechanisms at times come into play in 
assessing whether attorneys are associated in a firm for conflict 
purposes.  The Second Circuit has held that “[w]hether an 
attorney is associated with a firm for purposes of conflict 
imputation depends in part on the existence and extent of 
screening between the attorney and the firm.”  Hempstead 
Video, Inc., 409 F.3d at 134.  The Court reasoned that  
[an] ‘of counsel’ attorney, who handles matters 
independent of his firm and scrupulously 
maintains files for his private clients separate 
from the files of the firm, is less likely to be 
considered associated with the firm with respect 
to those clients than another attorney in the same 
position whose client files are not effectively 
segregated from those of the firm.   
Id.; see also N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 
715 (1999) (“[W]e believe screens should be accepted as a 
means of ensuring that part time lawyers are not deemed to be 
‘associated’ with a law firm.”).  
Screening may also be relevant in assessing whether the 
four requirements of Model Rule 1.7(b) are met, specifically 
whether an attorney will be able to provide competent and 
diligent services in non-prohibited representations.  See In re 
Fisker Auto. Holdings, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 13-cv-2100, 
2018 WL 3991470, at *2–5 (D. Del. Aug. 20, 2018) (denying 
a motion to disqualify because the four requirements of Model 
Rule 1.7(b) were satisfied, and noting that the law firm had put 
in place effective screening mechanisms).   
But a screening mechanism cannot cure a prohibited 
representation under Model Rule 1.7.  See, e.g., In re Cendant 
Corp. Sec. Litig., 124 F. Supp. 2d 235, 248–49 (D.N.J. 2000) 
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(holding that a proposed screen could not cure a prohibited 
concurrent conflict of interest).   
Golubitsky argues that if he continues as Bellille’s 
counsel, he will experience a conflict of interest and be forced 
to violate his professional responsibilities under Model Rule 
1.7(a).  He contends he has associated with the DiRuzzo firm 
by serving as of counsel, and so any conflicts that arise in that 
firm—here, its representation of Ayala—are imputed to him.  
Ayala is expected to testify for the Government in Bellille’s 
trial.  Golubitsky would, we presume, be required to cross-
examine Ayala.  He argues that this presents an unwaivable and 
nonconsentable conflict.  
The Government counters, and the District Court 
ultimately agreed, that there is no conflict of interest because 
DiRuzzo’s conflict is not imputed to Golubitsky by virtue of 
their of-counsel relationship.  Model Rule 1.10(a) only requires 
imputing a conflict of interest from one attorney to other 
attorneys if they are associated in a “firm,” Model Rules of 
Prof’l Conduct r. 1.10(a), and the District Court believed the 
relationship between Golubitsky and DiRuzzo was too 
attenuated.  
B. Factual Gaps and Legal Considerations to 
Address on Remand  
There are too many factual gaps in the record for us to 
apply the Model Rules and decide whether there was a true 
firm relationship between Golubitsky and DiRuzzo, and 
accordingly whether there was a concurrent conflict of interest 
that requires withdrawal.  If there were, the District Court 
would need to assess further the four requirements of Model 
Rule 1.7(b).  
18 
 
Possibly outcome-determinative information came to 
light at oral argument.  The District Court did not make 
findings on that information (nor can we), and it should create 
a record on remand in determining whether there is an imputed 
conflict of interest between Golubitsky and DiRuzzo.   
For example, Golubitsky stated at oral argument that he 
has access to the DiRuzzo firm’s files and that he and DiRuzzo 
speak almost every day.  Golubitsky has known and worked 
with DiRuzzo in different capacities since 2013, as both 
focused on federal tax litigation.  Golubitsky was previously of 
counsel at the DiRuzzo firm from October 2017 to June 2018.  
During that time he received remuneration from the firm and 
worked on cases with DiRuzzo.  These statements suggest a 
working relationship.   
Yet other evidence emerged that would further support 
the District Court’s conclusion that the relationship between 
Golubitsky and the DiRuzzo firm indeed is too attenuated.  For 
example, Golubitsky does not have an office or desk at, or a 
key to, the DiRuzzo firm.  Nor is there any other evidence that 
DiRuzzo and Golubitsky hold out that they are associated in a 
firm or make any public representations about Golubitsky’s 
role, such as on the firm’s website or on its letterhead.  We 
suggest further development of the record.6 
Especially puzzling are the factual gaps surrounding the 
circumstances of Golubitsky entering into an of-counsel 
 
6 The Court may also want to inquire as to the nature of 
the relationship between DiRuzzo and Golubitsky in 
connection with Brisa Max.  For example, Golubitsky stated at 
oral argument that DiRuzzo is compensated by Brisa Max for 
his work on Brisa Max cases.  We make no conjecture whether 
any such relationship is relevant.  
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relationship with the DiRuzzo firm.  He stated that he primarily 
rejoined the firm in 2019 in order to represent Bellille, but he 
did not learn of the client conflict until sometime between 
September 11 and 20 of that year.  Golubitsky could not 
explain, however, why his representation of Bellille did not 
come up before he joined the firm and before the conflict check 
if he was re-joining in part to represent Bellille.  Equally 
puzzling is why DiRuzzo’s representation of Ayala was not 
discussed before the conflict check.7  The District Court should 
inquire further into why this purportedly did not occur.   
The Court may also wish to determine whether 
Golubitsky and DiRuzzo attempted to associate to create a 
conflict.  If the answer is yes, it may want to take disciplinary 
action against one or both of the attorneys.  Golubitsky would 
probably be disqualified from representing Bellille based on 
the manufactured conflict and sanctionable conduct.  
To recap, as the record currently stands, it is unclear 
whether there is an actual of-counsel relationship between 
Golubitsky and the DiRuzzo firm, whether the label misstates 
the nature of the relationship, and whether the relationship was 
possibly entered to create a conflict of interest.  So the Court 
must first inquire whether the baseline facts are as Golubitsky 
and DiRuzzo allege.  If it concludes that there is no actual of-
 
7 It also emerged that Golubitsky had been appointed to 
represent Ayala in 2016.  However, he never met or spoke with 
Ayala and withdrew from representing her within two days of 
his appointment because of an imputed conflict with an 
attorney at the firm where Golubitsky was an associate at the 
time.  It is unlikely that an attorney-client relationship was ever 
formed between them, but the District Court should also 
consider supplementing the record on this to determine 
whether there is a conflict of interest regarding a former client. 
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counsel relationship, that ends the analysis; there is then no 
relationship to analyze for sufficient “association” under 
Model Rule 1.10.   
If the facts are as Golubitsky and DiRuzzo allege, 
however, so that there is an of-counsel relationship, then the 
Court must still inquire whether they were associated in a 
“firm” under Model Rule 1.10(a).8  We doubt that, if the 
 
8 The District Court relied on Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d 365, 
to conclude that the relationship between Golubitsky and the 
DiRuzzo firm was too attenuated.  In Kilpatrick, a former 
mayor was charged with, among other things, bribery, 
extortion, RICO conspiracy, and tax evasion.  Id. at 372–73.  
Prior to his indictment, Kilpatrick retained James Thomas to 
represent him in unrelated matters.  Id. at 373.  After Kilpatrick 
was indicted, the district court appointed Thomas and Michael 
Naughton as Kilpatrick’s CJA counsel.  Id.  After indictment 
but before trial, a third party filed a civil complaint against 
Kilpatrick.  Id.  The third party was represented by the firm of 
O’Reilly Rancilio P.C.  Id.  Thereafter, Thomas and Naughton 
became “of counsel” attorneys with that firm.  Id.  At a conflict 
hearing, Thomas explained that he and Naughton maintained a 
separate office, had separate electronic filings systems, and had 
no financial ties to the third-party litigation.  Id. at 374.  The 
district court declined to disqualify them.  Id.  After he was 
convicted, Kilpatrick appealed.  The Sixth Circuit held that 
Kilpatrick’s ineffective-assistance claim failed because he 
could not show a conflict of interest.  Id. at 375.  It concluded 
that Kilpatrick’s attorneys’ conflicts were not imputed.  Id.  It 
emphasized “the ‘thick ethical wall’ between Kilpatrick’s 
counsel and the firm; . . . and . . . the court’s decision to appoint 
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allegations are true, the Court can conclude that they are not so 
associated, as it is unlikely that two attorneys who are 
genuinely part of or associated with a three-person firm could 
effectively put in place screening measures to avoid the danger 
of inadvertent disclosure and the appearance of impropriety.9  
 
a fourth defense attorney to cross-examine the [third-party] 
witnesses.”  Id. at 375–76.   
Kilpatrick is readily distinguishable, however, because 
here there is no evidence of a “thick ethical wall” in the record.  
Here there was no additional counsel appointed, and 
Golubitsky and DiRuzzo had access to the same electronic 
filing system.  Moreover, in Kilpatrick the court did not allow 
two lawyers with an of-counsel relationship to be on both sides 
of the same case concurrently, even with screening.  
 
9 By analogy in cases involving former-client conflicts, 
courts have held that in small firms the existence of even the 
most effective screening mechanism could not avoid imputing 
conflicts of interest.  For example, in Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 
F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980), judgment vacated on other grounds, 
450 U.S. 903 (1981), the Second Circuit reversed a district 
court’s failure to disqualify a law firm.  The disqualified 
attorney was a member of a firm of thirty-five attorneys, he 
worked in the health law division when the case was being 
handled by the labor division, and the firm submitted affidavits 
stating that the attorney had not worked on the case.  Id. at 
1054, 1057–58 & n.6.  Cheng nonetheless concluded that there 
was “a continuing danger that [the conflicted attorney] may 
unintentionally transmit information he gained through his 
prior association [] during his . . . contact with defense 
counsel.”  Id. at 1058; see also Baird v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 
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If the District Court again concludes that Golubitsky 
and DiRuzzo were not associated in a firm under Model Rule 
1.10(a), that too ends the analysis.  If so, then there is no 
concurrent conflict of interest under Model Rule 1.7 that 
presents a problem for Golubitsky’s representation of Bellille.  
As noted, the Court concluded that the relationship between 
Golubitsky and DiRuzzo was too attenuated, but nonetheless 
ordered that they implement a wall, suggesting that there is 
indeed a relationship between them that needed to be walled 
off.  But it cannot be both ways.  Either the of-counsel 
relationship was not genuine and there was no basis for 
imposing a screen.  Or there was a true of-counsel relationship 
between Golubitsky and DiRuzzo, and a screen alone could not 
cure the conflict.  See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 124 
F. Supp. 2d at 248–49.10 
 
771 F. Supp. 24, 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that screening 
mechanism could not be effective in a firm consisting of nine 
attorneys and that counsel continuing would create an “obvious 
appearance of impropriety”).   
 
10 The Government cites Renz v. Beeman, No. 87-cv-
487, 1989 WL 16062 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 1989), to argue that 
the relationship between Golubitsky and the DiRuzzo firm is 
too attenuated.  In Renz, a magistrate judge declined to impute 
an of counsel attorney’s conflict to his firm where the attorney: 
(i) worked full-time outside the firm as in-house counsel; (ii) 
became “of counsel” for the sole purpose of obtaining the 
firm’s assistance in representing his own clients; (iii) accepted 
no assignments from the firm; (iv) had only a single contact at 
the firm; (v) shared a secretary; and (vi) only visited the firm 
once every few weeks.  Id. at *7–8.  Similarly, in our case, 
Golubitsky asserts he retains his full-time job as in-house 
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If the Court concludes that Golubitsky and DiRuzzo are 
associated in a firm under Model Rule 1.10, then there is an 
imputed concurrent conflict of interest, and it must assess 
whether the four requirements of Model Rule 1.7(b) are met to 
allow the representation to continue.  To repeat, if even one is 
not met, the Court must grant the motion to withdraw.  With 
respect to Model Rule 1.7(b)(3), the Court will need to engage 
in further fact-finding to determine whether Ayala and 
Bellille’s interests are truly adverse in the criminal trial.  In 
essence, will there be asserted “a claim by one client against 
another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation 
or other proceeding before a tribunal[?]”  Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct r. 1.7(b)(3).  Or will Ayala testify only against some 
or all of Bellille’s co-defendants but expressly not him?  If so, 
they may not be adverse.  We emphasize, however, that, if the 
Court concludes that Golubitsky is genuinely of-counsel at the 
DiRuzzo firm, and that Ayala and Bellille’s interests are 
adverse, then it may be a Model Rule 1.7(b)(3) violation for 
Golubitsky and DiRuzzo, two attorneys in an of-counsel 
 
counsel, only works part-time with the DiRuzzo firm, and then 
only works on a few select cases.  Golubitsky and DiRuzzo 
both testified that they have not had any involvement in the 
other’s work related to this case.   
However, there are critical distinctions between these 
cases that the Government overlooks.  In Renz the litigants had 
given their informed consent to be represented by possibly 
conflicted counsel.  Id. at *9.  And Renz involved a motion to 
disqualify an attorney representing a civil litigant, whereas our 
case involves a motion to withdraw claiming conflict of 
interest in a criminal matter where there is a possible Sixth 
Amendment bar to the representation. Hence Renz is not 
persuasive.   
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relationship, to represent Bellille, a defendant, and Ayala, a 
cooperating prosecution witness, in the same criminal trial. 
Another hurdle may be Rule 1.7(b)(2)’s bar on 
representations prohibited by law.  In a criminal trial, the 
interests of a defendant and a cooperating government witness 
are almost always adverse.  The Sixth Amendment confers a 
right to conflict-free counsel and bars representations that 
involve an actual conflict of interest.  See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 
446 U.S. 335, 349–50 (1980).  We have previously held that 
such a conflict of interest prohibits a representation, despite 
waiver by all parties, where counsel has “divided loyalties due 
to concurrent or prior representation of another client who is a 
co-defendant, a co-conspirator, or a government witness.”  
United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 749 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(emphasis added) (holding that counsel should be disqualified 
from representing a criminal defendant if he cannot ethically 
cross-examine a witness in that case); see United States v. 
Daugerdas, 735 F. Supp. 2d 113, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(holding that a law firm’s simultaneous representation of a 
defendant and a cooperating witness presented an actual 
conflict of interest and warranted disqualification, and stating 
that the court was not aware of “a single case in which a court 
permitted a law firm to simultaneously represent a defendant 
and a cooperating witness with adverse interests in the same 
criminal proceeding” (emphasis omitted)).11  Even concurrent 
 
11 To be sure, a criminal defendant can waive his Sixth 
Amendment rights in some circumstances, but it is not 
absolute.  As the Supreme Court has noted: 
 
[W]hen a trial court finds an actual conflict of 
interest which impairs the ability of a criminal 
defendant’s chosen counsel to conform with the 
[Model Rules], the court should not be required 
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representations of adverse clients in unrelated matters have 
been barred.12  Cf. United States v. Arias, 351 F. Supp. 3d 198, 
200–01 (D. Mass. 2019) (disqualifying defense counsel in a 
federal drug prosecution because he had an actual conflict of 
interest based on his concurrent representation of a cooperating 
witness in an unrelated matter so that the representation was 
 
to tolerate an inadequate representation of a 
defendant.  Such representation not only 
constitutes a breach of professional ethics and 
invites disrespect for the integrity of the court, 
but it is also detrimental to the independent 
interest of the trial judge to be free from future 
attacks over the adequacy of the waiver or the 
fairness of the proceedings . . . .  
 
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162 (1988) (quoting 
United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1184 (3d Cir. 1978)).  
 
To be clear, not every Sixth Amendment conflicted-
counsel issue makes for a prohibited representation, but on the 
record before us we cannot determine whether the 
representation here is prohibited.  Sixth Amendment rights 
ordinarily are the defendant’s to waive and are tied to the effect 
on the outcome for the defendant.  See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348-
49.  Ethics rules, by contrast, target the mere presence of 
conflicting interests, regardless of any effect on counsel’s 
performance.  See Model R. Prof’l Conduct 1.7(a), 1.16(a)(1). 
 
12 Even if the District Court concludes that Golubitsky’s 
representation of Bellille is not prohibited by law, it must still 
consider whether Bellille and Ayala consented in writing to 
potentially conflicted representation.  See In re Congoleum 
Corp., 426 F.3d 675, 691 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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barred by the Sixth Amendment and put him in violation of 
Model Rule 1.7); see also United States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d 
112, 120–21 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that an actual conflict of 
interest prohibited a representation, despite waiver by all 
parties, where a law firm represented a defendant in a criminal 
RICO prosecution, and separately a defendant in a parallel civil 
RICO action who had agreed to testify against the defendant in 
the criminal case).13  
 
13 Note that our opinion does not resolve any questions 
about the scope of Model Rules 1.7(b)(2) and (b)(3).  
Questions relating to those provisions were neither briefed nor 
argued by the parties and are not necessary to our disposition.  
And because it appears highly unlikely that either Bellille or 
Ayala will consent to any conflict, Rule 1.7(b)(4) probably 
suffices to resolve this case if the District Court concludes that 
there is a conflict.  See App. 131 (Tr. Oct. 31, 2019 hearing, at 
8:22); C.A. Dkt. No. 50, at 2 (Bellille letter).  So the Court need 
not resolve the application of subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) 
here.   
If it were necessary to reach those subsections, Judge 
Bibas would doubt whether Rule 1.7(b)(3) applied.  While a 
fact witness may claim that a defendant did certain things, she 
is not “asserti[ng] a claim,” meaning a legal right, against that 
defendant. Model R. Prof’l Conduct r. 1.7(b)(3); Assert, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (definition 2); Claim, 
in id.  Given the difficult questions involved in interpreting 
Rule 1.7(b)(2) and (b)(3), we avoid resolving them, preferring 
to await briefing and argument in a future case that squarely 
presents these issues. 
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*   *   *   *   * 
Accordingly, we remand for the District Court to 
develop further the factual record and decide Golubitsky’s 
motion based on that supplemented record.  It must first 
determine whether there is an actual of-counsel relationship 
between Golubitsky and DiRuzzo (in other words, whether the 
facts on the ground are as the parties allege).   
If there is no actual of-counsel relationship, 
Golubitsky’s representation of Bellille in theory could 
continue.  But the Court should also determine whether 
Golubitsky and DiRuzzo associated to create a conflict.  If the 
answer is yes, it may want to take disciplinary action.  In that 
scenario, Golubitsky would probably be disqualified from 
representing Bellille based on the manufactured conflict and 
sanctionable conduct.  
If there is a real relationship, then the Court must inquire 
whether Golubitsky and DiRuzzo were associated in a “firm” 
under Model Rule 1.10(a) based on the supplemented record.  
Were they not associated in a “firm,” the representation may 
continue and there is no need for screening mechanisms.  
If there is an actual relationship, and Golubitsky and 
DiRuzzo were associated under Model Rule 1.10, the Court 
must assess whether the four requirements of Model Rule 
1.7(b) are met.  If even one is not met—for example, if the 
Court concludes that the representation involves the assertion 
of a claim by one client against another client in the same 
litigation, or Bellille and Ayala did not consent in writing to 
the representations—the Court must grant the motion to 
withdraw.  
